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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Four years after the United Kingdom’s (UK) referendum to leave the European 
Union (EU), many questions remain, especially about the mechanics of the so-called 
“Brexit.” However, there is a general lack of media discussion about the effects of the 
Brexit on Scotland, who voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU, and two years prior 
to the EU referendum, Scotland voted to remain in the United Kingdom by a small 
margin. One of the main arguments for remaining in the UK was that there was doubt 
that Scotland could join the EU after leaving the UK. The research question for this 
project is, “What are the possible paths forward for Scotland in a post-Brexit future? And 
how likely are these options?” 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
How will Brexit impact Scotland, and what are the possible futures for Scotland? 
The 2016 European Union referendum (known colloquially as “Brexit”) in the United 
Kingdom has ramifications all over the world, but what it could mean for Scotland is an 
interesting question that has gripped the public and academic debates for four years. The 
referendum was a basic majoritarian vote, despite the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
proposing a referendum that was majoritarian U.K.-wide but also had a majority of 
“leave” votes in each nation in order to trigger Article 50 and withdraw from the 
European Union. 54% of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, but 
62.0% of Scotland and 55.8% of Northern Ireland voted to remain in the European 
Union. Even though Brexit was a non-binding referendum that only half of the four 
nations voter for, and that Scotland and Ireland are not only opposed to, but ardently so, 
the United Kingdom decided to trigger Article 50, the mechanism in the European Union 
by which a member state can start the process to leave the union. 
So the question continues, why Scotland, and not Northern Ireland? What is so 
important that an entire thesis needs to be spent on a small portion of an island all the 
way across the Atlantic? What impact does Brexit even have on the world? 
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Northern Ireland’s situation is a bit more complicated than Scotland’s. In part, the 
complication comes from the fact that not only did Northern Ireland vote to remain in the 
European Union by a smaller margin than Scotland, but should Northern Ireland secede, 
they have to face the addition question of whether or not they would join the Republic of 
Ireland or try to form their own state. Scotland, however, does not have a Scottish state 
that they can contemplate joining or not. This is additionally complicated, since the 
Republic of Ireland is an E.U. member state, so they would be able to enjoy member state 
status, whereas it is not clear whether or not Scotland would be able to join the E.U. 
Additionally, a bloody history between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
leading back to the Irish Civil War in the early twentieth century, as well as historical 
religious divisions between the north and south of the island continue in the memories of 
both. Whatever happens to Scotland will have ramifications for not only one of the 
United States’ key allies and trading partners, the United Kingdom, but also on the 
European Union. There is no precedent for a former region of an E.U. member state 
joining the E.U. after independence, and if Scotland secedes from the United Kingdom 
and attempts to join the European Union, their success or failure to enter the E.U. will set 
international precedent going forward. This will have economic ramifications for both the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. Scotland controls much of the United 
Kingdom’s agricultural economy, so if they secede, that would change the trade needs of 
the United Kingdom. This issue has been a continual point of debate. One of the key 
arguments for Scotland to stay in the United Kingdom during the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum was that if Scotland left the United Kingdom, that would mean 
that they would have to leave the European Union. 
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Scotland is a topic of discussion and serves as example of how Brexit impacts the 
United Kingdom as a whole. As such, over the years, the discourse on Scotland has 
developed, into the two spheres of discourse, academic and public. The academic debate 
is centered around how Scotland could avoid leaving the European Union, and this could 
help explain the results of the EU referendum. The public debate is mostly about the 
economic ramifications of Brexit to Scotland. These two debates occur simultaneously, 
but mostly separately, orbiting around each other. 
This thesis aims to outline the two spheres of debate, academic and public, and 
what the debates can tell interested audiences about Scotland’s future in a post-Brexit 
world. To do this, one must review the current literature and then extrapolate the findings 
of that review into feasible outcomes for Scotland, and how likely they are to achieve 
each outcome. The primary research question of this thesis is what are the most probably 
futures for Scotland in light of Brexit? These futures will be determined after a review of 
the academic and news debates regarding various topics related to Brexit and Scotland. 
As such, it is incumbent to engage with an extensive literature review that provides an 
analysis of the two spheres of debate: academic and public. 
The field is in need of more extensive literature reviews and meta-analyses, since 
the literature covers such disparate topics. 
These topics include possible futures for Scotland; for example, Fletcher and 
Zahn (2017) write about their interpretations of what could happen to Scotland in light of 
a Brexit. In the literature that follows, the three most probable futures for Scotland will be 
examined in a comprehensive manner, weighing obstacles and advantages of each 
possible future. 
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Much of the literature entertains the question of whether Brexit will happen at all. 
The finality of Brexit is not guaranteed, as it is not only a non-binding referendum, but 
the time limit specified under Article 50, which allows for a member state to leave the 
European Union, is two years, which the United Kingdom has already exceeded. Plus, 
since Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland are all adamantly against 
the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, leaving the E.U. could complicate 
relations with the Republic of Ireland or trigger secessionist actions from Northern 
Ireland and Scotland. The following review begins with an examination of literature 
regarding the questions surrounding the larger Brexit issues. While this literature is not as 
all-encompassing as is needed, it is a first step in tying the different subtopics together.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In 2016, the United 
Kingdom (UK) held a referendum 
on whether to remain or leave the 
European Union (EU) in an event 
that was colloquially deemed 
“Brexit.” “Brexit” refers to both 
the vote and the event of the UK 
leaving the EU. Following a 
surprising “Leave” result, the UK 
is now in negotiations to leave the 
E.U., but not every nation voted 
to leave the E.U. In fact, the only 
nations within the United 
Kingdom that had a majority 
vote to leave the E.U. were 
England and Wales. However, 
due to other factors, the nation most likely to attempt to secede from the U.K. is Scotland. 
First, some terminology requires defining, as the key players and events of Brexit are the 
United Kingdom and Scotland. Electorally, Scotland voted 62% (The Week 2016) to 
Fig. 1: How Did Your Area Vote? The electoral 
results of the 2016 EU referendum by region. 
(Map by Statistica. In “EU referendum: How did 
your area vote?”, The Week, June 24 2016.) 
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remain in the European Union (which can be seen in Figure 1, from Statistica for the 
publication The Week), which has led to tensions between the nation of Scotland and the 
state of the United Kingdom. In this usage, “nation” refers to a group of people (often 
associated with a territory) with a common identity, language, and/or culture; “state” 
refers to the government that has coercive power over the members of that nation. Often, 
states and nations coexist, but there are stateless nations (e.g. Kurdistan) and multi-
national states (e.g. Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom). Euroscepticism, which be 
discussed in greater detail in later paragraphs, is the apprehension of being a part of 
Europe. It must also be stated for an American audience that constitutional law 
discussions in the U.K. happen in a fashion that is fundamentally different than how those 
same discussions happen in the United States since the United Kingdom has no written 
constitution. 
The stunning unpopularity of Brexit in Scotland has led to widespread debate over 
the likelihood of Scottish secession. However, many of the reasons why Scotland would 
leave the UK is to preserve its relationship with the E.U., but it is unclear whether or not 
the E.U. will accept Scotland as a new member state (Fletcher and Zahn 2017). While 
Scottish secession is improbable for various social, economic, and political reasons, the 
possible threat of secession is likely enough to be a valuable bargaining tool for the 
Scottish government to pressure the central government into meeting their demands 
during the Brexit negotiations. 
The literature that was reviewed fell into two distinct categories: the academic and 
public debate. The academic debate usually had a more theoretical focus and gets into the 
specifics of topics like the legal options that Scotland has, about Scotland’s cultural 
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identity, and how much closer it is to Europe than the United Kingdom. Table 1 explains 
this breadth of topic in the academic arena. 
One thing that must be noted about the academic debate is that it varies wildly by 
subtopic. The public debate is very cohesive, but the academic one ranges from 
constitutional law to cultural connections to Scottish nationalism. The major failing in the 
current research is that it’s discombobulated, often with authors claiming that they are the 
only ones writing about Scotland or this very specific subtopic in regard to Scotland and 
Brexit. While they may technically be one of the few authors discussing that specific 
subtopic, there is a small academic debate about Scotland post-Brexit. 
Normally, geographic distance or a language barrier between researchers might 
account for some of the lack of communication, but much of the research done on 
Scotland has been either written by Scottish authors or at the very least published by 
Scottish or British universities. In this case, the lack of communication between authors 
can be attributed to their tendencies to focus on very niche subtopics that indeed seldom 
other authors are writing about. The field is in grave need of more meta-analyses. 
The majority of the literature on the United Kingdom after Brexit is equally as 
diverse in subtopic as the literature is about Scotland. It covers everything from to the 
international affairs of a post-Brexit world to the impact it will have on European 
languages to environmental and economic concerns about a not only a post-Brexit United 
Kingdom, but a post-Brexit world. Some of these pieces will be included in this analysis, 
but the broader academic debate about Brexit and the European Union is equally as 
disjointed and veering into wildly different subtopics, although there are a few articles 
that are commentaries on other works. This means that at least some authors are aware 
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that some other authors are writing about the European Union and Brexit. 
The public debate is, in comparison, extremely concise in sticking to the issues that 
citizens and politicians identify, instead of issues identified by academics. This is going 
to annoy some, as Rahmatian (2018) laments that that academia is wholly absent from the 
public debate. The main two issues discussed in the public debate are the economic 
fallout of Brexit and the struggle of power that would ensue between the Scottish and 
British Parliaments. Clearly, the public debate does focus on certain issues, unlike the 
academic debate, which is diverse. There are some variations, like the 2017 BBC, which 
was about the international relations of a post- Brexit Scotland, but most news articles 
focus on either political tensions or the economy. 
Before the discussion on the literature about Scotland, this is a quick review of the 
state of the literature on the United Kingdom and Brexit. White and Barnett (2018) 
respond to a proposal for a constitutional convention as a result of a lack of a strong sense 
of identity throughout the United Kingdom. They also mention a lack of understanding 
that some people have about what exactly Scottish nationalism entails (White and Barnett 
2018: 591). Sacerdoti (2017) writes about how the U.K. wants to pursue free trade with 
the European Union, but the 
E.U. is not prioritizing that on their side of the negotiations (Sacerdoti 2017: 3). 
Ham explores the forum non conveniens doctrine, the ability to “decline jurisdiction and 
dismiss cases in favor of a more convenient and appropriate forum,” in British law (Ham 
2020: 720). 
 
 
9 
Table 1: The Academic Debate 
Author 
(Year) 
Glencross 
(2015) 
MacKenzie 
(2016) 
McHarg and 
Mitchell 
(2017) 
McCorkindale 
(2016) 
Vidmar 
(2018) 
Fletcher 
and Zahn 
(2017) 
Focus Eurosceptic-
ism and 
Scottish 
independ-
ence (555). 
The cultural 
history of 
Scottish 
identity and 
the Scottish 
people. 
Scottish 
identity has 
changed, as 
evident in the 
change in the 
results of the 
1975 EU 
referendum 
(Scotland 
voted to stay) 
and the 2016 
EU 
referendum. 
The tensions 
between 
constitutional-
ly understand-
ing the UK as 
a unitary state 
or a union. 
International 
treaty law 
The different 
options that 
Scotland can 
pursue 
following the 
referendum 
and their 
consequences. 
Main 
Points 
The article 
predicts 
that the 
result of 
the 2016 
vote will 
exacerbate 
tensions 
surrounding 
both 
Eurosceptic-
ism and 
Scottish 
independ-
ence (555). 
A seafaring 
nation due to 
poverty at 
home and 
the 
geography of 
Scotland 
(577). Due to 
this history, 
Scots have 
lived all 
across Europe 
and are more 
connected to 
European 
identity than 
British or 
English 
identity. 
Changes in 
constitutional 
law theories 
over the years 
has 
changed 
Scotland’s 
views of how 
they can best 
negotiate with 
the EU, but 
time has not 
changed their 
desire to be 
involved in the 
EU. 
The source of 
the ongoing 
tensions 
between the 
UK and its 
nations 
is caused by an 
evolving 
understanding of 
the type of state 
the UK should 
become in the 
future and what 
it is today. 
This details 
the conflict 
between 
internation-
al treaty law 
and 
constitutional 
law. It also 
details the 
mechanisms 
through 
which the UK 
can legally 
leave the EU. 
All of the 
options put 
Scotland in a 
delicate 
position after 
the referendum 
vote that calls 
into question 
many issues 
with 
constitutional 
and 
international 
treaty law. 
Journal The 
Political 
Quarterly 
The Round 
Table 
The British 
Journal of 
Politics and 
International 
Relations 
King’s Law 
Journal 
Wisconsin 
Internation-
al Law 
Journal 
The 
Edinburgh 
Law Review 
 
Vidmar’s 2018 article is a good place to start with the literature, since it goes well 
with Fletcher and Zahn (2017). Vidmar (2018) details the specifics of the legality of 
Brexit in accordance with international treaty law, and Fletcher and Zahn (2017) also 
employ arguments about constitutional and international treaty law when explaining the 
options that Scotland could pursue. Vidmar “seeks to define the exact legal meaning of 
Brexit and its consequences” (2018: 429) in more technical terms than other authors do 
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and is the most descriptive of various aspects of EU law. This is the only work cited that 
is from an American publication. 
Fletcher and Zahn also discuss aspects of EU law throughout their article (2017: 
98-103), but they focus on the specific set of options that Scotland has in response to 
Brexit, and how international treaty and constitutional law effects the probability of those 
outcomes. Fletcher and Zahn claim that the three options that Scotland has are as follows: 
1) to secede from the UK, 2) to secede from the UK and seek EU membership 
independent of the UK, 3) to stay in the UK and try to independently negotiate treaties 
with the EU to try to make the best of the situation (2017: 98-103). While Vidmar (2018) 
is more detailed in his discussion of specific EU laws that pertain to the UK in this 
situation, Fletcher and Zahn (2017) are employs arguments with greater clarity that are 
formatted in a way that is easier for someone without a background in international law 
to understand. 
McHarg and Mitchell (2017) explain debates within constitutional law in a way 
that gives support partially to Fletcher and Zahn's third option for Scotland. In the 1975 
EU referendum, Scotland voted to leave the EU, while the opposite result occurred in the 
2016 referendum (2017: 512-513). McHarg and Mitchell describe the change as a result 
of a change in perception of how Scotland could best negotiate with the EU (McHarg and 
Mitchell, 2017:512). Scottish discourse in 2016 also looked different than English 
political discourse. 
In 2016, by contrast, Scotland produced the strongest Remain vote of 
any area in the United Kingdom (Gibraltar excepted), and each Scottish 
local authority area also voted to Remain. Although the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) had supported withdrawal in the 1970s, by 2016, 
no major Scottish party, including the Scottish Conservatives—and 
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indeed, no major Scottish politician—was in favour of this position. 
Euro-scepticism [sic] was simply not a significant feature of Scottish 
political debate, with the UK Independent Party (UKIP) consistently 
recording its lowest levels of electoral support in Scotland. (McHarg 
and Mitchell 2017: 513). 
McHarg and Mitchell introduce the idea that Euroscepticism is not a facet of political 
discourse in Scotland today. Glencross (2015) agrees with this, by asserting that 
Euroscepticism is an idea that has not really permeated Scotland and equivocates 
Euroscepticism to Scottish nationalism (555). Glencross goes further than McHarg and 
Mitchell and calls Scottish nationalism an alternative to Westminster’s neoliberalism, and 
emphasizes the political power of Scottish labor union workers (2015: 559). 
Glencross (2015) makes the argument that “euroscepticism [sic] and Scottish 
independence are based on exceptionalist identities that now revolve around economic 
policy,” (Glencross, 2015: 555). Glencross also predicted that the then-upcoming 
referendum vote would intensify the two debates. Glencross frames the debate as Scottish 
attempts to interrupt the spread of the Euroskeptics’ underlying neoliberalism (2015: 
555). This article was written after the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum and 
before the 2016 EU referendum, so naturally it focuses more on the former than the latter. 
MacKenzie’s 2016 essay is unique amongst all of the other works cited because it 
does not focus on politics or international law at first, but rather on the cultural history of 
the Scottish people. Towards the end of the article, he uses the foundation that he laid 
about the Scots to explain the EU referendum. For geographic and economic reasons, the 
Scots have always been a seafaring people, and that trade has spread Scots all over 
Europe (MacKenzie, 2016: 577-578). For this reason, “Scottish identity has been much 
more closely bound up with Europe than that of the English. Hence, it was no surprise to 
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find that Scottish voting practices in the referendum of 23 June 2016 were so strikingly 
different from those of the English and the Welsh,” (MacKenzie, 2016: 578). 
McCorkindale (2016) frames this issue as being caused by “an internal and 
uneasy tension between its unitary and union state identities” (McCorkindale, 2016: 354). 
Within this context, a union is a state that has a national government and devolved 
powers with their own unique powers, like the United States of America. A unitary state 
may have devolved powers but almost all of the power lies in the unitary government. 
While the United Kingdom is a unitary state, the nations within the UK (especially 
Scotland) have been granted more power and want more of a vital decision-making role 
in the Brexit negotiations than the UK is willing to give them (McCorkindale, 2016: 355-
356). White and Barnett (2018) discusses a proposal for a constitutional convention, and 
it touches on this same type of tension in identity; the premise for the call for a 
constitutional convention is based on the need for the formation of a united identity. 
Other academic articles are not included in Table 1. Rahmatian (2018), like 
McCorkindale, discusses the constitutional restrictions that would limit Scotland’s post-
Brexit options. Rahmatian makes the critique that academia has been absent from the 
public debate on the subject (2018). Rahmatian also argues that many of the pro-Brexit 
arguments misunderstood the European Union as an institution that was primarily 
designed to prevent war through the integration of economic markets (Rahmatian 2018). 
Rahmatian notes that Scots worry that the xenophobic sentiment that was evoked in the 
pro-Brexit could be used against ethnic Scots because they are not English. This 
compliments MacKenzie’s arguments that Scotland has a closer shared history with 
Europe than England (MacKenzie 2016). 
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The public debate found in the newspapers is mostly focused on the views of 
politicians, but there is a great amount of information on what average Scots think about 
Brexit and what their options are in that respect does exist. The public debate has a more 
limited scope than the academic debate. Table 2 provides a visual representation of the 
scope of the debate. 
Table 2: The Public Debate 
 
 
Author (Year) Sim (2018) Smith 
(2018) 
Rampen (2016) Dann 
(2017) 
No author 
(2020) 
Treanor 
(2017) 
Focus Political 
disagreeme
nt between 
the Scottish 
regional 
Parliament 
and the 
British 
Parliament. 
Political 
disagreemen
t between 
the Scottish 
regional 
Parliament 
and the 
British 
Parliament. 
Economic 
fallout of 
Brexit. 
Agricultural 
funding. 
Immigratio
n 
Economic 
issues. 
Main Points/ 
Developments 
This is 
about the 
separation 
of powers 
between 
the central 
and local 
authorities, 
and power 
struggles 
like this 
have 
increased 
after the EU 
referendum. 
The 
Scottish 
Parliament 
rejects the 
Brexit 
deal. 
While the 
U.K. 
Parliament 
can 
overrule 
this 
decision, 
but it would 
cause 
political 
problems. 
This was 
written right 
after 
The EU 
referendum. 
Poor areas 
voted to 
leave the 
EU, even 
though the 
majority of 
Scotland voted 
overwhelmingly 
to stay in the 
EU. 
The 
Scottish 
National 
Party and 
Scottish 
Greens 
want 
Scotland 
to 
have 
control over 
the UK’s 
agricultural 
funding 
after Brexit. 
Scottish 
first 
minister 
Nicola 
Sturgeon 
warned 
that post-
Brexit 
immigratio
n 
quotas will 
not be 
sustainable 
for 
Scotland. 
The Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
was 
considerin
g moving 
their 
headquart-
ers to 
Amsterda
m after 
Brexit. 
Publication BBC BBC New 
Statesman 
Farmer’s 
Weekly 
BBC The 
Guardian 
 
The articles in Table 2 outline the debate well. Sim (2018) writes about the 
difficulty deciding which powers post-Brexit should go to the Scottish Parliament as 
opposed to the Parliament in London. Certain powers that the European Union has now 
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that would have to revert back to the United Kingdom (for example, making trade 
agreements and controlling immigration), and the two have been struggling over whether 
or not certain powers would be devolved to the Scottish Parliament (Sim, 2018). 
Arguments over which powers should be central or devolved have occurred between 
Holyrood and Westminster for a while, but the European Union referendum have 
increased the prevalence of these (Sim 2018). The Smith piece (2018) is an example of a 
power struggle between those two seats of government, specifically it concerns the 
Scottish Parliament’s rejection of the Brexit proposal, the proposal for how and why the 
United Kingdom would leave the European Union, and what effects that could have on 
the United Kingdom’s plan to leave to European Union. Westminster could legally 
decide to override that decision and leave the European Union, but that would create 
great political tension between the two Parliaments (Smith, 2018). 
The Rampen piece (2016) was written following the vote on the European Union 
referendum, and it focuses on the economic fallout of Brexit for Scottish businesses, 
although it does mention that the majority of poor Scots, like poor Englishmen, voted to 
leave the European Union, unlike the general majority of the nation. The Dann piece 
(2017) touches on both political tension and economic issues, because it is about how the 
Scottish National Party (SNP), the majority party in Scotland, and the Scottish Greens 
want post-Brexit agricultural funding for the United Kingdom to be under Scottish 
control. This is particularly of interest as the vast majority of farmers in the United 
Kingdom are Scottish, and Scotland makes the vast majority of Scottish agricultural 
output. The 2020 BBC article talks about Scottish concerns over the United Kingdom 
restricting low-skill immigration after Brexit, which will damage the Scottish economy 
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because they need those workers for the agricultural industry. 
The Treanor piece (2017) discusses the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and looks 
into the consequences of the possible movement of their post-Brexit headquarters out of 
Scotland. The proposed reason why The Royal Bank of Scotland would leave the United 
Kingdom is so that they could maintain a European presence and a business path in 
Europe. This article also underscores some of the economic effects of the United 
Kingdom leaving the European Union, which is that businesses based in the United 
Kingdom will no longer have the same level of access to the European market, which 
means that if businesses want the same level of access to the European market that they 
had previous to Brexit, they will have to move operations out of the United Kingdom. 
Doing so will have a disproportionate effect on small businesses that will not be able to 
move their operations overseas but that will no longer have the same easy access to the 
European market. 
The 2017 BBC article and the 2018 Rahmatian article are very complimentary in 
topic, which is ironic since Rahmatian does not present a position that the public debate is 
informed enough by academia. The Rahmatian piece not only talks about the institutional 
barriers to Scotland being able to leave the United Kingdom and joining the European 
Union, but it also mentioned that the xenophobia stirred up in the pre-Brexit arguments in 
support of Brexit could be turned against non-English ethnic minorities (Rahmatian 2018). 
The 2017 BBC article is about solidarity between Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the 
Republic of Ireland against Brexit. While the article does not mention ethnic conflicts 
specifically, it does mention border conflicts, which could exacerbate ethnic issues (BBC 
2017). 
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Other news articles include a 2017 BBC article that talks about how Scottish first 
minister aligning herself and Scotland with the Republic of Ireland against Brexit. 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and the Republic of Ireland are against the United Kingdom 
leaving, albeit for slightly reasons. They all agree on common issues that Brexit would 
bring to their nations, but Scotland’s main issues with the plan are economic, while the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are concerned about closing the border between 
them (BBC 2017). Leask (2020) discusses the international security implications that an 
independent Scotland could have, 
including Scotland’s anti-nuclear stance that could mean that they would remove British 
missiles from Scottish soil, which is a concern for NATO. 
Reviewing this information informs the likely options for a possible future for 
Scotland after Brexit. The academic debate sometimes ponders the future for Scotland, 
whereas the public debate tends to focus on current developments. Key takeaways are 
that it is unlikely that Scotland would be able to join the European Union, due to several 
factors, Euroscepticism is not a large part of modern Scottish political discourse, and that 
certain powers currently centralized in the European Parliament would have to return to 
the United Kingdom, and Westminster and Holyrood are currently engaged in a power 
struggle over certain areas, like agricultural funding and immigration. All of these 
takeaways can be extrapolated into three possible futures for Scotland in after Brexit, if 
occurs.
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS 
From the literature, there are three possible outcomes, but some are more likely 
than others. This section will discuss the outcome, the positives and negatives provided 
by the outcome, how likely the outcome is, and what the world would look like should 
the outcome come to fruition. These three outcomes are as follows: no Brexit, greater 
autonomy within the United Kingdom, and independence from the United Kingdom. As 
it stands currently with COVID safety precautions and response detracting from the 
energy and debate that would be allocated to Brexit and the fact that there is still 
currently no exit deal between the United Kingdom and the European Union, Brexit is 
unlikely to occur in the near future. If Brexit does happen, the most likely outcome is that 
Scotland will demand greater autonomy; it needs to be noted that while this outcome is 
slightly more likely than the third outcome, the emphasis is on slightly. The third and 
least likely (but still likely) outcome is that Scotland will secede from the United 
Kingdom, either joining the European Union or not. 
Fletcher and Zahn give only two options: independence or European Union 
membership without independence (2018: 98-99). However, these are not the only two 
options, and the option that is the most likely often gets ignored on the assumption that of 
course Brexit is going to happen. This assumption, while academically and legally sound, 
fails to account for the public debate and the absolute refusal of the Scottish public to go 
quietly into that good night with Brexit. It is important for scholars to not only review the 
academic debates in situations like this, but also look to non-academic’s positions as they
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are stakeholders in the situation’s outcome as well. 
Option One: 
 
The first option is the least dramatic and least fun one to analyze; however, as the 
years continue, it is becoming increasingly the most likely. With COVID-19 outcomes 
and safety measures dominating much of the news and the fact that the United Kingdom 
has failed to present the European Union with an exit bill that has been approved by all of 
the regional legislatures, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom will be leaving the 
European Union any time soon. Scotland rejected the United Kingdom’s exit bill in 2018 
(Smith 2018). The Kingdom continuing to push through a bill rejected by a regional 
Parliament would definitely escalate tensions and overall be unproductive and result in 
angering the Scottish more than they already have been angry about Brexit (Smith 2018). 
The United Kingdom has already exceeded the two- year time limit in Article 50, which 
is the E.U. provision that allows a member state to leave the union (Vidmar 2018: 428). 
The provision allows for there to be a two-year negotiation period between the European 
Union and the leaving member state, and if the two bodies do not come to an agreement 
by the end of that period, then that cuts off the member state from the European Union 
entirely without any relationship with the union (Vidmar 2018: 428). The European did 
vote to extend this two-year period, but if they were willing to do it once, they might be 
willing to keep extending the deadline. 
With this option, the benefits are that the United Kingdom and all its nations can 
avoid the economic devastation that would come from not being able to have the same 
access to the European market. No businesses would have to leave, and low-skill 
immigrants could still have access to the Scotland, thus providing agricultural labor that 
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powers Scotland’s large agricultural economy. Another positive will be that this will 
hopefully not exacerbate the ethnic tensions between the Scots and British, like 
Rahmatian (2018) suggests might happen after Brexit. 
Another benefit to this future for Scotland is that the E.U. referendum and Brexit 
negotiations have exacerbated previously existing tensions in the United Kingdom, 
mainly xenophobia and the power struggles between Westminster and the regional 
Parliaments. If Brexit did not happen, that would lessen a lot of those tensions, although 
there is an argument to be made that they will not simply go away, only lurk under the 
surface of public discourse for a few years only to reappear later. The United Kingdom, 
which does not have a very revolutionary political culture, does not do very well with 
change, and while other states might even encourage tensions to rise in order to affect 
change, that is generally not how the United Kingdom prefers to operate. If they have the 
choice to opt out of Brexit altogether, they might take it. 
As previously stated, this option may be ignored because it is not very dramatic, 
and the academic debate takes for granted that following the referendum is what the 
government would actually enact. Since the European Union referendum is non-binding, 
the decision to leave is largely built on misleading or inaccurate statistics and 
xenophobia. Both Northern Ireland and Scotland are united in their view on leaving the 
European Union, even citing the same reasons publicly (BBC 2017). The Scottish 
government refuses to entertain the notion of leaving the European Union, and while 
Westminster could overrule Holyrood, it would create negative optics and probably cause 
more problems than it would solve. 
One negative aspect of this option is that the xenophobic sentiment that was used 
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to make pro-Brexit arguments in the lead up to the referendum vote could either go away 
(which is a desirable outcome), or be suppressed so long that they inevitably rise to the 
surface of public discourse in an equally or perhaps even more destructive vote or 
decision down the road. Nationalist identities have been growing in the United Kingdom 
for years, and the English are starting to get exacerbated by what they feel are 
unnecessary regional identities (White and Barnett 2018: 591). The English sometimes 
confuse the nationalist movements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland as ethnic 
nationalist movements, when in reality they are more similar to civic nationalism, and 
this is especially true of Scottish nationalism (White and Barnett 2018: 592). 
Another negative aspect of this option is that it could be perceived as subverting 
democracy. To better illustrate the issues of democratic subversion. The SNP originally 
proposed that the vote not be a simple majority, but in order for the United Kingdom to 
actually leave the European Union, all four nations would have to all have a majority 
“leave” vote in order for the United Kingdom to trigger Article 50 (Vidmar 2018: 440). 
Since all four nations would have to leave the European Union together, there probably 
should have been four different votes instead of the one referendum for the whole state, 
and it would be an easy argument to make that a decision that requires a majority vote 
from all four nations of the United Kingdom is democratic. The argument about the 
democracy of this option can be found in the academic literature, literature that seems to 
take for granted the idea that the U.K. would in fact leave the E.U. Yet the public debate 
was not nearly as settled, and news coverage portrays the issue as if it is an ongoing 
struggle rather than an inevitability. 
Just because something legally or constitutionally should or could happen, does 
 
21 
not guarantee that it will, even in a democracy. This is simply because there is more to 
democracy than voting. For example, authoritarian states will hold “elections” because 
they are an easy tool to give the regime a veneer of legitimacy and democratic aesthetics. 
Democracy is not just following the results of an election. While elections are supposed 
to be indicators of public opinion, what should happen if the calculated public opinion is 
not accurately represented in the election results? This is especially complicated because 
of the misinformation that preceded the E.U. referendum coming from the “leave” 
campaign. This begs the question as to what is even is the most democratic action to take 
in this situation? The simple answer is to follow the referendum, but then the question is 
about how democratic is it to override the wants of not only the Scottish but Irish people 
as well? How is a referendum truly democratic when one side of the campaign spread 
blatant misinformation as their argument to leave the European Union? If the people were 
deliberately misled into believing one thing, can that really be considered a democratic 
decision? Democracy, especially in this case, is very complicated and academics do 
themselves a disservice when they try to simplify it by only analyzing constitutional law 
and institutional power. The widespread sentiment against Brexit in Scotland makes it 
harder to argue that leaving the European Union would be completely democratic, but 
since England and Wales voted to leave, staying would be going against their democratic 
wants. In fact, before the official Brexit referendum, the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
proposed that the vote should be “a U.K.-wide majoritarian vote that would require 
support in all four constitutive countries: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland” (Vidmar 2018: 440). It’s a difficult situation, and while most academics 
understand that it is complex from an institutional or constitutional perspective, since 
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most academics barely mention the public debate, they tend to ignore the complexity of 
the public opinion and informal democracy. 
Option Two 
 
The second option is the most likely to occur if the United Kingdom does indeed 
leave the European Union. Still, this is not as likely as Brexit may simply not happen in 
the foreseeable future. This option is that Scotland gains powers that were previously 
under the purview of the European Union, like immigration, economic spending, trade 
policy with certain Scottish industries, thus gaining greater autonomy even while 
remaining in the United Kingdom. 
The reason why staying and gaining greater autonomy is more likely than leaving 
the United Kingdom is that scholars are unclear whether or not Scotland could 
technically join the European Union, as there is no precedent for that in the history of the 
EU. This is one of the reasons why the Scotland chose to stay in the United Kingdom in 
the 2014 referendum, and the main motivator for Scotland to leave the U.K. after Brexit 
would be for Scotland to join the E.U. 
Even though Scotland probably can’t join the European Union while remaining in 
the U.K., Scottish politicians and political parties still use the threat of secession as a tool 
in negotiations with Westminster. There have been calls to hold another independence 
vote if the U.K. actually passes a Brexit bill through the E.U. Parliament. Leaving the 
E.U. would send shockwaves through every part of British society and be a destabilizing 
force. On top of that, the threat of Scottish secession would further destabilize the state, 
which is something the United Kingdom wants to avoid. 
Scotland’s access to greater autonomy could have several various outcomes. It 
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could mean that Scotland has a few powers that the European Union currently has over 
the United Kingdom, or it could mean that Scotland is given almost complete autonomy 
on their economic and diplomatic relations with the E.U. Scottish politicians already want 
all control over the United Kingdom’s agricultural funding after Brexit to go to Scotland 
(Dann 2017). Scottish first minister Nicola Sturgeon has already expressed that 
Westminster’s post-Brexit immigration is inadequate to suit Scotland’s economic needs 
(BBC 2020). 
Any Brexit negotiations will have enormous implications for Scottish trade with 
the EU, drastically impacting the Scottish economy. Trade within the EU is relatively 
easy because the states have agreed-upon trade guidelines, but trading with the EU as a 
non-member state can be more difficult. The Scots want greater autonomy in negotiations 
with the EU in general, but they cannot negotiate directly with the EU because the UK is 
a unitary government, and the devolved powers at the national level do not have unique 
powers that supersede the powers of the unitary central government (Fletcher and Zahn 
2017: 100). 
In a sense, the fate of the Scottish economy is under the jurisdiction of the UK 
government and the Scottish Parliament does not have any autonomy in negotiating with 
the EU. Utilizing a threat such as secession to influence the Brexit negotiations and the 
trade negotiations pertaining to Brexit in particular could grant Scotland at least some 
control over their future situation. It could work to pressure the British Parliament, and 
the Scottish National Party has seats in the British Parliament to aide in pressuring that 
entity. 
The positive effects to gaining greater autonomy are that Scotland could sidestep 
 
24 
some of the economic fallout of leaving the European Union, negotiate directly with the 
European Union, and perhaps satisfy Scottish civic nationalism for a little while. It might 
not be enough to satisfy the Scottish nationalist movement long term but depending on 
the amount of autonomy that Scotland is able to negotiate from Westminster, it could be 
enough for a while. By being able to negotiate directly about trade with the European 
Union, Scotland will be able to control the economic fallout of Brexit, thus being able to 
mitigate the damage that Brexit could do to the Scottish economy. As it stands right now, 
Westminster and Westminster alone have complete control over all Brexit negotiations, 
which is part of the tension between Holyrood and Westminster. 
The negative implications of this option fit into two categories: the negatives of 
threatening secession in order to achieve greater autonomy, and the negatives of having 
to leave the European Union. Threatening secession may be the best solution for 
Scotland, but there are some negatives that would complicate using the threat of 
secession. The Scottish Parliament would have to time this well, because if they 
threatened to hold an independence referendum too early, then they will take themselves 
away from the table without having acquired a favorable deal for Scotland. On the other 
hand, if they only threaten such a referendum for too long without a follow-through, then 
the threat will lose its potency. The threat only works if the UK government believes that 
Scotland could feasibly believe that Scotland could actually secede. 
While the UK government could take the threat seriously, they could also 
perceive it to be political grandstanding on the part of the Scottish and ignore it. The only 
way that the threat could work as a negotiation tool is if the UK sees the threat as 
legitimate. If the UK perceives the threat as illegitimate, then there is no incentive for 
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them to bow to any demands made on behalf of the Scottish people. The Scottish 
Parliament must make it clear to the British Parliament that the former entity has every 
intention of seceding should the threat not be taken seriously. Then, if Scotland secedes 
after the British Parliament continues to ignore their demands, then the Scots have both 
lost their negotiating power and have angered a global power for the possibility that it 
might join the EU in the future. 
Unfortunately, this future necessitates that Scotland leave the European Union 
permanently. One of the major reasons to vote to stay in the United Kingdom in the 2014 
Scottish independence referendum was that leaving the U.K would mean leaving the E.U. 
Scottish nationalism is not Eurosceptic, and actually Scottish national identity includes a 
close relationship with the European continent, and some have argued that part of 
Scottish national identity historically is having close cultural ties with the continent of 
Europe. Also, even greater autonomy from the United Kingdom is not going to satisfy 
Scottish nationalists for long. If Scotland remains in the United Kingdom, it will likely 
leave the E.U. and with no option to rejoin. If, however, Scotland secedes from the 
United Kingdom, it may or may not be able to join the European Union. 
It is unclear whether greater autonomy will impact the xenophobia that some are 
worried that the Scots will get. There’s an astonishing lack of understanding by 
Englishmen of the nature of Scottish nationalism, with some thinking that anyone not 
ethnically Scottish will be thrown out of the nation, when that is not what Scottish 
nationalism is at all (White and Barnett 2018: 591). Additionally, nationalist movements 
in Wales and Northern Ireland exist, and the result could be that people in England who 
misunderstand Scottish nationalism use it as an excuse for ethnic nationalism or 
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xenophobia. 
The occurrence of this scenario is slightly more likely than independence. In 
conclusion, Scotland could use the threat of secession as a tool to obtain greater 
autonomy from the United Kingdom. It is unclear whether this will satisfy Scottish 
nationalism or not, and it is also unclear whether or not it will have any effect on possible 
xenophobia towards Scots. This option also necessitates leaving the European Union, 
whereas other options do not, and ultimately, the main goal of Scotland is not to leave the 
European Union. 
Option Three 
 
The third and least likely option is Scottish independence. This is not only the 
least likely result as it would require Brexit to actually happen, and because greater 
autonomy seems to be more feasible than independence. However, it has its advantages 
just like the others, and is the most drastic solution, and definitely the solution that is that 
Scottish politicians posture as if this is the one that they’ll choose. Posturing for 
independence aides any attempts that they want to gain greater autonomy, since the 
United Kingdom has a vested interest in keeping Scotland part of the United Kingdom. 
There are many positives to this option; this option, unlike the previous one, at 
least allows for the possibility, albeit a slim possibility, that Scotland could join the 
European Union. If this occurred, the long-term economic fallout of leaving the E.U. 
would be avoided, although Scotland would have to exist outside of the E.U. in an 
interim period before they were accepted. Even so, they would be able to directly 
negotiate with E.U. themselves, as opposed to only being able to approve of what 
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Westminster negotiates. Scottish politicians are lobbying for greater autonomy to 
negotiate directly with the European Union, if, however, Scotland gains independence, it 
will be able to unilaterally set its own terms in the interim between leaving the United 
Kingdom and joining the European Union. This is preferable to the current arrangement 
of Westminster making deals with the European Union when Scotland does not even 
want to leave the European Union in the first place. Being forced to leave the European 
Union and being prevented to mitigate the damage that will be done to Scotland is the 
main reason why Scottish politicians are threatening to hold a second independence 
referendum the moment that something happens in Brexit that is unfavorable to Scotland. 
The main reason likely resulting in Scotland’s secession from the United 
Kingdom would be in order to join the E.U. The academic debaters do not have a 
consensus on whether Scotland would actually be able to this, since there is no precedent 
for a former region of a member state joining the European Union. With or without 
secession, “an independent Scotland would be the clearest legal route to membership of 
the EU should the UK leave, although by no means guaranteed,” nonetheless at least 
Scotland could legally be able to apply to join to E.U., whereas it could not join as only a 
region of the United Kingdom (Fletcher and Zahn 2017: 95). With this option, Scotland 
has an opportunity to rejoin the United Kingdom, whereas the chances are much slimmer 
should they try to lobby for greater autonomy. 
Scotland would probably have the support of Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland, considering the 2017 BBC article, which states those three nations’ united 
front against Brexit, for various reasons. The main reason why this is improbable is the 
United Kingdom’s interest remains to block Scotland from seceding. Not only are there 
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historical ties between all of the nations and England, but since Northern Ireland is also 
against Brexit, there could be worries that independence for Scotland would embolden 
Irish separatist movements. Northern Ireland’s fate is a little more complicated in some 
ways than Scotland, because if they leave the United Kingdom, they have the option of 
either joining an existing state or creating their own; however, if they wish to remain in 
the European Union, they should join the Republic of Ireland since it is an E.U. member 
state. There is a Welsh separatist movement and political party, but since Wales voted 
originally to leave the European Union, then Scottish secession based on European Union 
membership may not sway them, but they could be persuaded by Scotland’s example of 
independence in general. In short, Scotland’s secession could cause a domino effect of 
separation, and as such the United Kingdom would try to prevent Scottish secession. 
An obstacle to this option is that Scotland would have to negotiate with the United 
Kingdom directly, and secession will understandably make those relations very tense. 
Unlike Wales, or Northern Ireland should they choose to secede, Scotland shares a land 
border with England, and since neither state will be an E.U. member state, they will have 
to enforce a border there, which could lead to political violence. It could also just generally 
be difficult to negotiate with a power that one just seceded from; it took the United States 
and the British Empire a while before they were on good diplomatic terms. Part of this very 
struggle is seen in Brexit negotiations now; the European Union is not happy that the 
United Kingdom is leaving the union, and that is making negotiations very difficult 
between the two Parliaments. With the history between England and Scotland, there is the 
potential for the negotiations to escalate tensions between those two powers. 
The other main obstacle to this future is that it is not guaranteed that Scotland will 
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be able to join the European Union after secession. There is no precedent for a former 
region of a European Union member state rejoining the European Union, and even if 
Scotland could rejoin the European Union, it could take years. The literature is 
inconclusive about how feasible this is; if pressed to draw a conclusion, it is cautiously 
optimistic. The problem is that the main factor for secession would be for European 
Union membership, which option two does not allow for and remaining in the European 
Union is currently a primary goal for the Scottish Parliament, politicians, parties, and first 
minister. If Scotland were to secede and were not able to procure E.U. membership, then 
they would have potentially escalated tensions between England and Scotland, possibly 
inspired secessionist movements in Northern Ireland and maybe Wales, still have to deal 
with the economic repercussions of leaving the European Union, all to end up 
permanently outside of the European Union anyways. It has a higher reward than the 
second option, because Scotland finally gets independence and possibly European Union, 
but it also has a higher risk in that Scotland will have to go through a lot in order to only 
maybe be able to join the European Union. 
A positive aspect of this future is that since Scotland has already formed a 
positive relationship with the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (BBC 2017), so 
they might have allies in their independence efforts. Seceding from the United Kingdom 
to join the European Union might make it easier for them to negotiate with the European 
Union before Scotland is admitted into the E.U. and also ingratiate Scotland with the 
European Union, making the E.U. amenable to negotiating with Scotland. Scotland is 
going to need allies when they secede, as diplomatic recognition and established allies are 
vital for new states. If the Scotland has the support of Northern Ireland, E.U. member 
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state the Republic of Ireland, and even a few E.U. member states, that would ease their 
transition into an independent state. Secession is a difficult process, especially when the 
newly independent state is seceding from a regional or global power like the United 
Kingdom. The state that the new state is leaving does not even have to be powerful 
themselves, as long as they have powerful allies, other states will be hesitant to recognize 
the new state. Historical examples of states that have had difficulty receiving diplomatic 
recognition because of either the power of the state that their trying to secede from, or 
their allies are Taiwan (because of the People’s Republic of China) and the Western 
Sahara or Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (because of the United States’ and other 
powerful states’ support for Morocco). Part of the reason why the Kurds still do not have 
a Kurdish state, despite it being promised to them after World War I, is because in order 
to officially establish Kurdistan, the Kurds would have to secede from not one, but four 
states, and they lack a lot of strong international allies. 
However, if Scotland cannot get allies to recognize it and risk angering the United 
Kingdom, that could really hinder the Scottish economy and their ability to have 
diplomatic and trade relations with other states. It could also be an international security 
risk for Scotland to not have any allies, since they would be left out of diplomatic 
meetings about international security. They may or may not be able to join NATO, and 
they may or may not be able to join other IGOs. If Scotland is allowed into the European 
Union, it will probably make it easier for them to join other IGOs, and since the United 
Kingdom will not be a member of the European Union and Brexit negotiations have 
soured relations between the E.U. and the U.K., the United Kingdom will not be able to 
do much to prevent Scotland from joining the European Union. There is a possibility that 
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if Scotland is able to join the E.U., their membership will be able to legitimize them 
enough to make their membership into other IGOs and diplomatic circles easier, but it is 
not guaranteed that Scotland would be able to join the European Union. 
In light of security risks, there are British nuclear submarines that are currently 
based near Glasgow, but Scotland has vowed to not be a nuclear state despite also 
wanting membership in NATO, which highly prioritizes those nuclear weapons (Leask 
2020: 14). There is also international concern that Scotland will not align with the United 
Kingdom on certain future foreign policy decisions; Leask mentions concerns about 
Scottish decisions over Libya and Iraq specifically, but this concern is not limited to 
those areas (Leask 2020: 17). If Scotland wants to remove the nuclear-armed submarines 
from their territorial waters, then NATO would have a problem with that, possibly 
jeopardizing Scotland’s ability to join NATO. Since NATO’s main concern is that those 
submarines are the United Kingdom’s only nuclear deterrent, according to Leask (2020), 
that raises the question of why those submarines have to be stationed off of the coast of 
Scotland and they absolutely cannot be moved to the south, off the coast of England. 
In summary, Scottish independence has many benefits, the chief of which is that 
Scotland could be able to join the European Union, and that they might already have 
allies, which they would need in order to secede from a power like the United Kingdom. 
Some of the obstacles are the difficulties of secession, and the international security and 
diplomatic risks that Scotland might face as a result of leaving the United Kingdom, 
especially in the interim period before they can join the European Union. While most 
scholars are cautiously optimistic Scotland’s ability to join the E.U., it will still take some 
time before they are accepted into the union. During this time, there will be a struggle to 
 
32 
establish alliances, although they might already have an ally in the Republic of Ireland in 
particular. The United Kingdom also has a vested interest in not allowing Scotland to 
secede, which is another obstacle to this option. The separatist movements that have been 
steadily expanding in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The reason why this is 
option is the least likely is that although it has the opportunity to provide Scotland with 
what it wants: a Scottish state and E.U. membership, it also has obstacles are great and 
the E.U. membership might not even happen. The first future does not have much of 
these obstacles, while still allowing Scotland to have European Union membership. The 
second one, while it does require Scotland to leave the E.U., would allow for Scotland to 
negotiate directly with the European Union on their own terms, instead of London 
negotiating for Scotland. This is still a likely future for Scotland.
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the academic and public debates can inform what the possible 
futures for Scotland could be, and from these possibilities, the community can plan for 
each possible outcome. These three futures are not the only ones that are possible: Brexit 
could happen without giving Scotland greater autonomy, Scotland may not be able to join 
the E.U., there could be another Brexit referendum that has a different result, etc. 
However, based on the literature, the options outlined of no Brexit, greater Scottish 
autonomy, and Scottish independence are the most likely futures for Scotland. There are 
many benefits and obstacles for each of these futures. 
Key takeaways from this thesis are that no matter what happens, Scotland will 
continue to be in a difficult position, and that a significant number of problems have been 
and continue to be caused by tensions between England and Scotland. An underlying 
problem in Scottish politics is that they are not allowed full autonomy under a British 
unitary government, and decisions like Brexit only exacerbate the sentiment that Scotland 
is being ignored. Brexit could be interpreted to feed the narrative that Scotland is being 
forced into actions that Scotland does not want to take. This is Scottish politicians 
rejected the United Kingdom’s E.U. withdrawal bill, because they do not want to be 
forced to follow a course of actions that Scotland voted against following (Smith 2018). 
Another key reflection is the need to not have research that is too niche, as that can result 
in disparate topics. What appears to have happened is that the academic authors chose 
specialized topics after Brexit, and then much of the research by consequence was highly 
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specific. Many articles include general information on Brexit, so a general audience 
reader would have some idea of what they are talking about, but the specialization makes 
it difficult to ascertain a consensus. When Rahmatian (2018) says that the academic 
debate outside of constitutional law is absent from the public debate, one wonders if that 
might be a result of the specialization making it difficult to apply lessons from the 
academic debate to the public one. Also, as pointed out in the literature review, there is a 
news article about immigration, not constitutional law, that agrees with Rahmatian. 
There are many areas for further research in this field; there is a need for meta-
analyses and large literature reviews because the academic literature especially varies 
wildly by subtopic. This is also not meant to be an analysis about the United Kingdom as 
a whole; all of these futures have implications for the other nations in the United 
Kingdom that was not discussed in as great of detail as it could have been. This could be 
a plan for future research. Comprehensive opinion polling of the Scottish public could 
also be a plan for any future research. 
This is research is important because it attempts to collect information from 
academic and news sources and apply that information to discern what Scotland’s future 
might be after Brexit. Scotland, as the home of a significant portion of the U.K.’s 
agricultural economy, is important to study for economic reasons. Scotland is also 
important to study because if Scotland secedes from the United Kingdom, that might 
embolden at least Northern Ireland, if not Wales as well. There are also international 
security implications of an independent Scottish state. 
I must admit that my research has some limitations. First, I was not able to do 
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opinion polling on my own, so I do not have my own data on some of these issues. 
Secondly, this did not have as extensive a literature analysis as I would have liked to have 
done, which was mostly a result of time restraints on my part. The public debate also 
shifted away from Brexit a little and towards the COVID-19 response in the United 
Kingdom. 
However, the importance of research like this is that it can help prepare the 
international community for seismic shifts, like Brexit and possible Scottish secession. If 
research like this continued, the academic community, as well as possibly the public, 
would be able to anticipate the consequences of certain actions. The community would be 
able to engage in a better-informed general debate, instead of many people looking at 
small niche areas of research under this same topic with nothing to guide the discussion. 
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